Journal of Natural Resources &
Environmental Law
Volume 12
Issue 1 Journal of Natural Resources &
Environmental Law, Volume 12, Issue 1

Article 6

January 1996

In Defense of FIFRA Preemption of Failure to Warn Claims
S. Douglas Fish
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jnrel
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Fish, S. Douglas (1996) "In Defense of FIFRA Preemption of Failure to Warn Claims," Journal of Natural
Resources & Environmental Law: Vol. 12: Iss. 1, Article 6.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jnrel/vol12/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For
more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

In Defense of FIFRA Preemption of Failure

to Warn Claims
S. DOUGLAS FISH*

Suppose you own a company that manufactures pesticides. In
compliance with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act1 (FIFRA) and the regulations promulgated thereunder, you take the
detailed steps to have the pesticide and the pesticide label approved by
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). After approval, your
company sends the pesticide to the marketplace. Imagine your surprise
when, after having your pesticide and label approved under FIFRA, an
action is brought against your company claiming that the label failed to
warn a user of an alleged risk. Was the EPA approval of the label for
naught? Does not a federal law preempt state law when Congress has
chosen to occupy the field? And has not Congress, through FIFRA,
chosen to occupy the field?'
This is the issue faced by various courts considering failure to
warn claims against pesticide and chemical manufacturers regulated
under FIFRA. While a great majority of the courts have sided with
defendant-manufacturers in these cases, some courts have found and
some commentators assert that FIFRA does not preempt state common
law failure to warn claims based on the EPA-approved labels. This
Note seeks to defend the approach taken by the great majority of courts
in finding FIFRA preemption of failure to warn claims. Part I will
present an overview of FIFRA and preemption doctrine. Part II will
discuss the cases interpreting FIFRA's preemption clauses. Part III
explains that FIFRA's preemption clause should be interpreted to
preempt state common law failure to warn actions because that approach
advances the goals of FIFRA, is in line with Supreme Court precedent,
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Pub. L. No. 80-104, 61 Stat. 163 (1947) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
(1994)).
2

For a competing tale of woe told from the plaintiffs perspective, see R. David AlInut,

Comment, FIFRA Preemptionof State Common Law ClaimsAfter Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
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and leaves those who have been hurt by a pesticide approved under
FIFRA with some remedy at common law. Finally, Part IV will
examine the most recent case in which the Supreme Court interpreted
a preemption statute and explain why its holding is not applicable to
FIFRA failure to warn claims.

1. FIFRA: THE LAW AND ITS HISTORY
Congress passed FIFRA in 1947 to replace the Insecticide Act of
1910. 3 The 1947 Act provided for thorough and comprehensive
regulation of pesticides. In addition to expanding the scope of the
Insecticide Act, which sought to prevent deceptively mislabeled and
watered-down pesticides in the flow of commerce, FIFRA was passed
to address problems with pesticides that various state acts, including the
Uniform Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, had attempted to
address, namely the prevention of harm to humans from pesticides
Under the 1947 Act, all pesticides in interstate commerce had to be
registered with the Department of Agriculture.
Congress greatly amended FIFRA in 1972.6 Changes were made
7
in pursuit of the goal of "protect[ing] man and his environment," and
administration of FIFRA was removed from the Department of
Agriculture and placed in the hands of the EPA.' The 1972 Amendments also expanded the statute's reach to include intrastate sale and use
of pesticides.9 Further, less comprehensive amendments were made in
1988 and in 1991.10
Section 136v is of particular importance to the discussion of

The Insecticide Act of 1910, ch. 191, 36 Stat. 331(1910), repealed by The Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 80-104, 61 Stat. 163, (codified as amended
9 94
36 36
at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1 -1 y (1 ).
' William T. Smith, III & Kathryn M. Coonrod, Cippolone 'sEffect on FIFRA Preemption,
61 UMKC L. REv. 489,490(1991).
' Timothy J. Kuester, Comment, FIFRA as an Affirmative Defense: Pre-emption of
Common-Law Tort Claims of InadequateLabeling, 40 U. KAN. L. REv. 1119, 1122 (1992).
6
Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 to 136y).
See S.REP. No. 92-838, at 3 (1972). reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993, 3999.
"The EPA was created in 1970 and was only two years old when it received statutory
authority to enforce the regulations contained in FIFRA." Brian M. Brown, Note, Federal
Preemptionof State Tort Law Failureto Warn Claims by FIFRA: Injury Without Relief?., 4 S.C.
ENVTL. L.J. 147, 149 n.14 (1995).
' See S.REP. No. 92-838, supra at note 7, at 3994.
'0 Pub. L. No. 100-532, 102 Stat. 2655 (1988) (codified as amended at scattered sections of
7 U.S.C.).
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FIFRA preemption. Section 136v(a) grants states the power to "regulate
the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or device in the
State," but with the limitation that the states cannot regulate such sale
or use in contradiction of FIFRA." Section 136v(b), which bears the
heading "Uniformity," makes clear that, notwithstanding the States'
power authorized in section 136v(a), "Such State shallnot impose or
continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition
to or different from those required under this subchapter."' 2 Clearly,
then, Congress has disallowed any state statutory enactment that
purports to regulate labeling or packaging on pesticides. The question
remains, however, what effect FIFRA preemption has on state common
law tort actions that effectively do the same.
A. Pesticide and Pesticide Label Review Under FIFRA
Both FIFRA and the EPA regulations promulgated pursuant
thereto have brought extensive control to pesticide manufacturing and
labeling. 3 The process of registration begins with the pesticide
manufacturer's application to the EPA. 4 In addition to the application,
the applicant may be required to submit detailed descriptions of tests
performed as required under the EPA's regulations, and the results of
those tests. 5 The application must also include a copy of the label the
manufacturer intends to place on the pesticide container. 6 The EPA
reviews the label for, among other things, the adequacy of warnings and
precautions provided, and appropriate directions for use.' 7 Warnings
and precautionary statements are subject to regulations dictating the
content, type size, color, placement, and prominence of the writing on
the label.'" If the pesticide poses a risk to human or animal life, the
warning should identify with particularity the hazard, how one may be
exposed to the hazard, and how the hazard may be avoided. 9 Furthermore, directions for use must be written so that an average person using

7 U.S.c. § 136v(a) (1994).
2

Id. § 136v(b).

Judi Abbott Curry et al., FederalPreemptionof PesticideLabeling Claims, 10 ST. JOHN'S

'

J. LEGAL COMMENT. 325, 328 (1995).
' 7 U.S.C. § 136(c) (1994).
6

Id. § 136a(c)(1)(F).
Id. § 136a(c)(1)(C).
40 C.F.R. § 156.10(a)(1) (1996).

"

Id. § 156.10(h).

"

IId. § 156. 10(h)(2)(i)(A).
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the pesticide can read and understand the directions."0
In general, specific language is not required for warnings and
precaution statements. Instead, the EPA's regulations supply general
guidelines and typical warnings for different categories of pesticides to
aid the pesticide manufacturer in writing its own warning tailored to the
specific hazards posed by its product.2 This makes sense in the realm
of pesticide regulation because EPA could not promulgate one warning
label that would be effective for every pesticide, nor could the EPA
reasonably be expected to create such a warning label. Thus, allowing
the manufacturer to submit a warning label for EPA review and
approval is the most sensible and efficient way to promote the goals of
FIFRA.
B. Preemption
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides
that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; ...any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding."22 Modem interpretation of this Constitutional clause has led to two possible ways a federal statute can be found
to preempt state or local law: express or implied preemption. In
express preemption, the court will look to the statutory language to
determine if it specifically states that it preempts an area of law.23
Implied preemption may arise when a statute is so thorough and
comprehensive that it is clear Congress intended to "occupy the field,"
or where state law directly conflicts with federal law.24
II.

CASES ADDRESSING

FIFRA

AND PREEMPTION

OF FAILURE TO WARN

The controversy surrounding FIFRA preemption has only surfaced
relatively recently. The first case to address the question whether
FIFRA preempted a state common law failure to warn claim answered
the question in the negative. In Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.,2 an

20 7 U.S.C. § 136(q)(l)(E); 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(i)(1)(i).
21
22
21

2S

(1996).
See 40 C.F.R. §§ 156. 10(a)-(j)
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
Cipollone v.Liggett Group,Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
I' See 7 U.S.C. § 136v (1994); text
Id.
atnn. I I& 12.
736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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agricultural worker in the United States Department of Agriculture
contended that he developed pulmonary fibrosis as a result of skin
exposure to the herbicide paraquat.26 Paraquat was registered with the
EPA, and the label involved was approved by the EPA under FIFRA. 7
The label warned of the possibility of severe skin irritation upon
exposure to paraquat, as well as the risk that prolonged exposure could
result in skin absorption of paraquat. 28 The trial court found in favor of
the plaintiff based on Chevron's failure to warn the plaintiff of the risk
exposure to paraquat could result in chronic lung
that prolonged
9
disease.

2

On appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Chevron contended that FIFRA preempted the
plaintiffs failure to warn cause of action." Chevron argued that the
EPA's approval of the label, coupled with FIFRA's preemption clause,
prevented a state court from finding otherwise.
In rejecting Chevron's arguments, the court found FIFRA served
a regulatory function, while state common law tort actions served the
different function of compensating injured individuals.3' The court
concluded that, simply because the EPA approved a label using a costbenefit analysis does not mean that a state court cannot compensate an
injured party if the label does not warn of a significant risk.32 Thus, in
the absence of federal preemption, a state court is not bound by the
conclusions of the EPA.
The court found no express preemption in section 136v(b) of
FIFRA. Congress had specifically expressed its intent with regard to
common law preemption in other preemption statutes, but failed to do
so here. 3 Applying implied preemption analysis, the court found that
state common law did not conflict with FIFRA because a pesticide
manufacturer has what has been termed a "choice of reaction:" 34 Either
do nothing and accept the liability when state courts find liability, or reapply to the EPA to have the label changed to incorporate the warning

26

Id. at 1531-32.

27
28

Id. at 1539.
Id. at 1536-37.

29

Id. at 1532.

Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1539 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1540.
32 Id.
'
Id. at 1542.
: Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158, 162
(10th Cir. 1992).
30

31
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the court found to be lacking." According to the court, because the
manufacturer has the option of not changing the label, there is no
conflict between FIFRA's labeling requirements and state common law
tort actions, and therefore there is no implied preemption under FIFRA.
Later circuit court decisions addressing FIFRA preemption of state
common law failure to warn actions concluded differently than the
Ferebee court. Arkansas-Platte& GulfPartnership v. Van Waters &
Rogers, Inc.,36 for example, involved a business that acquired property

formerly occupied by a business where wooden fence posts were treated
Several employees of
with a chemical known as Dowicide-7.1
Arkansas-Platte were poisoned by pentachlorophenol vapors from the
site, and the company sued the manufacturer and distributor of
Dowicide-7 on a negligent failure to warn theory." The defendants
made a motion for summary judgment based on FIFRA preemption, but
the motion was denied. On interlocutory appeal, however, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that FIFRA implicitly
preempted plaintiff's failure to warn theory.3 9

The court looked at the language of section 136v(b) and concluded
that it expressly preempted statutory enactments of state law pertaining
to product labeling. With regard to common law tort damage awards,
the court reasoned that such court pronouncements would directly
conflict with FIFRA.' Thus, FIFRA implicitly preempted such actions.
The Arkansas-Plattecourt found some support for its position in
the Supreme Court's decision in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v.

Mortier." In Mortier, the Court addressed whether FIFRA preempted
local regulation of pesticide use. Although the Court answered this
question in the negative,42 more important to the Arkansas-Platte
decision was the implication throughout the Mortieropinion that while
local use regulations were not preempted, any regulation of pesticide
labeling was preempted under FIFRA.43 Although the Court's decision
',

Id.

36 959 F.2d 158 (10th Cir 1992), vacated and remanded sub nor, Arkansas-Platte & Gulf
Partnership v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 U.S. 910 (1992).
31 Id. at 159.

1s Id. at 159.
11 Id. at 159.
10 Id. at 161.

4t501 U.S. 597 (1991).
Id.at 606-14.
41 "[Section 136v(b)] would be pure surplusage if Congress had intended to occupy the entire
field of pesticide regulation." Id. at 613; "As we have also made plain, local use permit
42

regulations-unlike labeling or certification-do not fall within an area that FIFRA's 'program'
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in Mortier did not directly address whether FIFRA preempts state
statutory or common law and its implications are only dicta, the
decision indicates that the Court may find that FIFRA preempts state
common law failure to warn claims.
The Tenth Circuit in the Arkansas-Plattedecision did not accept
the "choice of reaction" analysis formulated by the court in Ferebee."
The decision concluded that the choice was illusory, as logical business
considerations would clearly warrant a label change.45 Thus, the choice
is inconsistent with FIFRA's mandate that state law addressing labeling
and packaging requirements be preempted.
A. Turning Point: The Cipollone Decision
In Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,46 the Supreme Court
specifically addressed whether federal cigarette laws preempted state
tort law damage claims. The federal laws at issue in Cippolone were the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965"' and the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969.48 The trial court found that
neither Act preempted state law failure to warn actions.4 9 On interlocutory appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.5" On remand,
a jury verdict found the failure to warn claim preempted, but predicated
its decision for the plaintiff on the defendant's breach of express
warranties and failure to warn its customers of the health risks of
smoking prior to the 1966 effective date of the legislation.5 The Third
Circuit affirmed the decision on appeal, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.52
In addressing the question whether the federal statutes preempted
state common law actions, the Court did not engage in an implied
preemption analysis. Instead, it limited its inquiry to an express
preemption analysis, explaining that where Congress had addressed the
preempts or even plainly addresses." Id. at 615.
Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158, 162-3
(1992); Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
41 Arkansas Platte, 959 F.2d at 162-63.
- 505 U.S. 502 (1992).
4' Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1965), amended
by The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1994).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1994).
41 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 510.
I0
d.at 511.
Id. at512.
U

52

Id.
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preemption issue in a statutory provision, the Court should give effect
to only that expressed in the preemption provision. 3 The 1965 Act
provided that, "[n]o statement relating to smoking and health, other than
the statement required by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on
any cigarette package."54 The 1969 Act provided that, "[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed
under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the
provisions of this Chapter.""
The Court determined that the 1965 Act fell short of preempting
the petitioner's state tort law damage claims because the language used
showed that Congress was not attempting to preempt the entire field,
and because there is a presumption against preemption where Congress
attempts to usurp those powers, i.e., the police powers, usually reserved
to the states.16 As to the 1969 Act, the Court concluded differently. The
amendments made in the 1969 Act convinced the Court that Congress
now intended to preempt the field, including state statutes as well as
state common law doctrine.57 The question then addressed was whether
the claims at trial were preempted by the 1969 Act. Some were found
to be preempted, including the failure to warn claim, while others
simply were not reached by the preemption provisions and thus
survived.5"
B. The Effect of Cipollone on FIFRA Preemption Cases
Before Cipollone was decided in 1992, the courts were equally
split as to whether FIFRA preempted state common law failure to warn
of
actions.59 After Cipollone, however, the overwhelming majority
6
courts have found that FIFRA does indeed preempt such actions. 0

5-1 Id. at 517.

" 15 U.S.C. §§ 13 34(a) (1965), amended by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1994). Section 1333 sets forth requirements with regard to warnings,
packaging, advertisement and billboards.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b)(1994).
'6

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 502, 518-20 (1992).
Ild. at 520-24.

51 Id. at 524-30.
" Smith & Coonrod, supranote 4, at 499.
61 Id. at 502.
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III. JUSTIFYING FIFRA PREEMPTION
Though the Supreme Court spoke authoritatively in Cipollone,
some feel that the conclusions drawn in that case do not necessarily
apply to a FIFRA preemption case. The following is a discussion of the
arguments set forth against FIFRA preemption insuch cases, and a brief
rebuttal on each point.
In arguing that Cipollone can be distinguished from a FIFRA
preemption case, opponents of FIFRA preemption have latched on to
the differences in language between section 5 of the 1969 Act and
section 136v(b) of FIFRA. Whereas the 1969 Act's language allows no
"requirements or prohibitions.., imposed under State law,"'" FIFRA's
preemptive language is limited to "requirements" by a "State."'62 Thus,
opponents of FIFRA have concluded that the two statutes are not
analogous, and the reach of FIFRA must be less than that of the 1969
Act. 63
The fact that the two statutes are not exactly alike must be
conceded. However, to conclude that FIFRA has a lesser preemptive
reach than the 1969 Act one must equate the words "prohibitions" and
"law" with the words "state common law tort actions," and the
omissions of these words should not be grounds for a finding that the
preemptive effect is materially different. The Cipollone decision
demands that the FIFRA preemption clause be analyzed under the test
articulated by the court: Where there exists in a statute a preemption
clause, a court should not engage in an implied preemption analysis, but
should focus on the express intent of Congress in the preemptive clause
to establish the extent of preemption.6' Thus, instead of comparing the
FIFRA preemption statute to the statute at issue in Cippolone, the
FIFRA preemption provision itself must be examined to determine what
Congress intended to preempt.
The Court in Cipollone recognized that regulation could be exerted
just as effectively through an award of damages as through positive state
enactments, and thus no distinction should be found between the two.65
This is true because the underlying premise of a failure to warn claim is

15U.S.C.§§ 1334(b)(1994).
62 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1994).
6
See Brown, supra note 8, at 164-65; Ailnut, supra note 2, at 875; Sandi L. Pellikaan,
6

FIFRA Preemptionof Common-Law Tort ClaimsAfter Cipollone, 25 ENVTL. L. 531,538 (1995).
Cipollone v. Liggettt Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 502, 517 (1992).
65 Id. at 521.
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that additional warnings should have been provided to the consumer.'
Thus, any state common law failure to warn action must conflict with
FIFRA's preemption clause just as a state statute would. It necessarily
follows that any common law failure to warn action results in
"requirements" by a "State" that conflict with those under FIFRA, and
are preempted by section 136v(b).
It is also clear from Congress' decision to title the preemption
section "Uniformity" that the goal of Congress was to create a single,
comprehensive regulatory scheme for all pesticide manufacturers rather
than a patchwork of state-enacted schemes in addition to the federal
law. 67 Furthermore, as shown previously in the discussion of the
Mortier case, the Supreme Court has implied that FIFRA clearly
preempts state common law failure to warn actions based on alleged
6
improper labeling and packaging.
Opponents also argue that the "choice of reaction" analysis
promoted by Ferebee should be the preferred analysis.69 That choice is
simply'nonexistent. The Supreme Court considered and rejected this
analysis in the context of a state nuisance challenge to a paper mill's
emission of pollutants into Lake Champlain in InternationalPaperCo.
v. Ouellette.7" The defendant paper mill in that case emitted pollutants
pursuant to an EPA permit under the Clean Water Act (CWA). Should
the plaintiffs recover, the Court reasoned, the defendant would have to,
"at a minimum... change its methods of doing business and controlling
pollution to avoid the threat of ongoing liability."71 The same must be
true under FIFRA, where good business judgment would compel a
pesticide manufacturer after losing a state failure to warn action to repetition the EPA for a change in its labeling. One court has compared
this so-called choice in the choice of reaction analysis to "the free
choice of coming up for air after being underwater."" Considering the
Supreme Court's rejection of the choice of reaction analysis, then, it
should be clear that the analysis can no longer validate state common
law actions in conflict with FIFRA section 132v(b).
Those who oppose FIFRA preemption strenuously argue that
Caroline E. Boeh, Note, Cipollone v. Liggett Group. Inc.:

One Step Closer to

Exterminating the FIFRA Preemption Controversy, 81 KY. L.J. 749, 776 (1992/1993).
+' See Kuester, supranote 5, at 1136.
See supra notes 41-3 and accompanying text.
69 See Pellikaan, supra note 63, at 542.
70 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
7'

Id. at 495.

7'

Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620,627 (1st Cir. 1987).
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Congress surely would not and did not intend to preempt state common
law tort actions meant to compensate innocent victims of insufficient
warnings on pesticide labels."3 This, however, is by necessity Congress'

intent by enacting a comprehensive regulatory program intended to
bring uniformity to the area of pesticide labeling and packaging.74 As
discussed previously, Congress and the EPA together have created a
formidable process whereby a pesticide and its label are subject to great
scrutiny." Congress must have concluded when it created this
regulatory structure that the EPA should be the only assessor of the
warnings needed on such products.76 Otherwise, the idea of uniformity
would be mere "surplusage."" State actions where liability is predi-

cated on a failure to warn will be decided differently by different juries
both within and outside a state, creating the very disjunctive and
nonuniform law that prompted Congress to pass FIFRA.
Those opposing FIFRA preemption argue that allowing state
common law failure to warn actions will not result in nonuniformity
because under the regulations no uniform warning is required.78 This
argument, however, fails to recognize that pesticide manufacturers have
little leeway under the regulations because they must follow the
guidelines and model warnings, as well as warn of known dangers. It
is of necessity that no uniform warning label is provided for under the
regulations, since all pesticides are not alike and manufacturers must
warn of the particular risk(s) their products present. This may result in
two very similar pesticides having differently worded labels, but the
substance of both will be the same. Thus, the pesticide labeling
regulations are as uniform as possible given the wide scope of the
regulations, and such uniformity is substantially the same as regulation

See Pellikaan, supra note 63, at 541-42.
Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1025 (1 th Cir. 1991), vacatedand remanded sub
Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 505 U.S. 1215 (1992).
noma,
"

7' See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
76 See Kuester, supra note 5, at 1140 ("Congress envisioned a uniform scheme of consistent
labeling requirements to be executed exclusively by the EPA."); James P. Herrington, Local
Regulation of Pesticide Use and State Failure to Warn Claims: What Does FIFRA Preempt?-Wisconsin PublicIntervenorv.Morn'er,501 U.S. 597 (1991), 11 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH.

J. 317, 336 ("(J]uries who are ill-equipped with the technical knowledge needed to weigh the
benefits ofsafer products against the costs to pesticide manufacturers and American agriculture will
be making determinations of the adequacy of labels.")
7 Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 613 (1991).

7 See Stephen D. Otero, Note, The Case Against FIFRA Preemption: Reconciling
Cipollone's Preemption Approach With Both the Supremacy Clause and Basic Notions of
Federalism,36 WM. & MARy L. REv. 783,832 (1995).
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which provides a uniform warning for all products, such as the cigarette
warning label required under section 1333 of the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969.
Finally, it is important to note that FIFRA only preempts a
specifically defined area of state common law: negligent failure to warn
actions based on product labeling. Those who wish to pursue liability
against a pesticide manufacturer may do so by claiming that the
manufacturer should have given warnings apart from its label to the
community of users,"' or by basing liability on a design defect.80 FIFRA
section 136v does not preempt these causes of action, and a plaintiff
seeking compensation may be able to collect on those grounds.
IV. MUDDYING THE WATERS: MEDTRONIC V. LOHR

Recently, the Supreme Court passed judgment in a case that could
have important ramifications in the continuing controversy of whether
FIFRA preempts failure to warn claims. That case, Medtronic v. Lohr,&t
arose when a pacemaker component manufactured by Medtronic
allegedly failed and Lohr required emergency surgery to correct the
heart problems that ensued. 2 The pacemaker component was regulated
under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA)."3 Lohr filed
suit, putting forth strict liability and negligence claims, including
negligence based on a failure to warn. 4 In response, Medtronic moved
for summary judgment based on the preemption provisions contained
in the MDA. 5 The District Court granted the motion and dismissed

7' See Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp 1128, 1140 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
80 See Kevin McElroy et al., The FederalInsecticide, Fungicide,and Rodenticide Act:
Preemptionand Toxic Tort Law, 2 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 29,39-42 (1990).
sI 116 S.Ct. 2240(1996).
82 Id. at 2248.
" The Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-295,90 Stat. 539 (1976), amended
by The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-305); Medtronic, 116
S.Ct. at 2246-48.
'

Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2248.

Sid. The preemption statute, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994), provides as follows:
(a) General rule
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political
subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device
intended for human use any requirement(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable
under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this
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Lohr's complaint.86 On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the 11th
Circuit, the decision was reversed in part and affirmed in part. In
particular, the Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the lower court
insofar as the failure to warn claims were concerned. The court cited
the extensive labeling regulations promulgated by the FDA as conclusive proof that any claims of insufficient labeling were preempted. 7
A majority of the Supreme Court, however, came to a different
conclusion. The Court unanimously held that the strict liability claim
for design defect was not preempted by the MDA, but as to the
negligence claims, including the failure to warn claim, the Court split
5-4 against preemption. The majority opinion, authored by Justice
Stevens, first focused its attention on the review process established by
the MDA and what that process requires of medical devices before they
are brought to market.8" Specifically, the Court noted that two exceptions, a grandfather provision which allows devices on the market
before the MDA took effect to continue on the market without FDA
approval, 89 and another provision which allows devices that are
"substantially equivalent" to products already on the market to be sold
after only an abbreviated review, 9° created a situation where only a
small portion of the devices brought to market were required to go
through the extended review provided for under the MDA.9 1 The
pacemaker component involved here was only subject to the abbreviated
review, as it was substantially equivalent to devices already on the
market. 92
The preemption provision at issue, the Court noted, clearly
preempted state statutory law. The question, however, was whether it
preempted state common law. To answer this question, the Court
looked to two guiding principles: First, states are sovereign entities, and
' preempt state common law; and
Congress would not "cavalierly"93
second, the Court must look to Congressional purpose of the statutory
provision at issue to determine its meaning.9*
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91 Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2246-48.

"z Id. at 2248.
9'

Id. at 2250.

94 id.

J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.

[VOL. 12:123

Using these guiding principles, Stevens' opinion summarily
rejected Medtronic's argument that all common law actions are
preempted by the MDA.95 This, in his view, could not have been the
intent of Congress, for it precluded state courts from protecting
consumers from injuries resulting from medical devices.96 Such an
interpretation of the preemption statute, Stevens opined, would have
"the perverse effect of granting complete immunity from design defect
liability to an entire industry that, in the judgment of Congress, needed
more stringent regulation." 97
Furthermore, Stevens' opinion addressed the language of the
preemption provision and found it, too, to be lacking a clear intent to
preclude all common law causes of action. He specifically focused on
the word "requirement"' in the statutory language and noted it was a
"singularly odd word" to use if total preemption was the goal of
Congress. Stevens distinguished Cippolone, and its holding that a
provision preempting state "requirements" could also bar common law
damages claims, on the basis of the limited effect of the statute in
Cippolone as compared to the far greater effect total preemption under
the MDA would have both on state sovereignty and the ability of
plaintiffs like Lohr to have some remedy for their injuries.9 In a
footnote, Stevens further differentiated Cippolone by noting that the
statute involved in Cippolone in itself preempted the claims, whereas
the preemption statute at issue here relied on agency regulations to
define the scope of preemption.'0
Stevens, however, was only able to amass three justices in support
of his preemption analysis. Whereas Stevens concluded that the
preemption provision would rarely, if ever, preempt state common
law, Justice Breyer, writing in concurrence, was not willing to read
the statute so restrictively. Justice Breyer offered this example to
support his reasoning:
Imagine that, in respect to a particular hearing aid
component, a federal MDA regulation requires a 2-inch
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wire, but a state agency regulation requires a 1-inch wire.
If the federal law, embodied in the "2-inch" MDA regulation, pre-empts the state "1-inch" agency regulation, why
would it not similarly pre-empt a state tort law action that
premises liability upon the defendant manufacturer's
failure to use a 1-inch wire (say, an award by a jury
persuaded by expert testimony that use of a more than 1inch wire is negligent)? The effects of the state agency
regulation and the state tort suit are identical. To distinguish between them for pre-emption purposes would grant
greater power (to set state standards "different from, or in
addition to" federal standards) to a single state jury than to
state officials acting through state administrative or
legislative lawmaking processes.l 2
This, however, is the import of the plurality decision, an "anomalous
result" 13 that Justice Breyer concludes was not intended by Congress.
Justice Breyer also stated his belief that the language in the
preemption statute at issue in Cippolone is sufficiently similar to the
language used in the MDA preemption statute to conclude as the Court
had in Cippolone that "[state] regulation can be as effectively exerted
through an award of damages as through some form of preventive
relief."'
Thus, in Justice Breyer's opinion, a state tort law action
which imposed requirements on a medical device manufacturer would
be preempted under the MDA if a similar state statute or regulation
would be preempted.
Nevertheless, Justice Breyer concluded that the state law claims at
issue were not preempted because the FDA had issued a regulation
stating the state requirement must be "different from, or in addition to,
the specific [federal] requirements"'0 5 under the MDA to be preempted.
Since the state law claims, including the failure to warn claim, put forth
by Lohr were not in conflict with "specific" laws or regulations of the
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MDA, Justice Breyer found no federal preemption.' °6
Justice O'Connor, joined by three other justices, concurred in the
decision insofar as it held there was no preemption of the design defect
claim, but dissented with regard to the negligence claims. The dissent
found no merit in the plurality's position that the word "requirement"
used in the preemption provision does not encompass state common law
claims, and instead found the rationale of Cippolonecontrolling.' The
dissent further found fault with both the plurality's and Justice Breyer's
reliance on an agency regulation to interpret the statute when the statute
Because the dissent refused to consult the
is clear in its meaning.'
regulations to interpret the preemption statute, it thus read the statute
without the requirement imposed by the plurality and Justice Breyer that
the federal requirement be specific in order to preempt any state
requirement. The statute and its regulations are, in the dissent's view,
sufficiently comprehensive to preempt the manufacturing and failure to
warn claims put forth by Lohr 1 9
V. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF MEDTRONIC V. LoHR

There are several significant differences between the MDA and
FIFRA preemption provisions that provide a basis for believing the
Supreme Court, or any other court for that matter, might reach a
different conclusion than that reached in Medtronic when addressing
whether FIFRA preempts a failure to warn claim. The arguments put
forth here were extracted from a recent decision, Lewis v. American
Cyanamid Co., 0 which considered Medtronic's effect on FIFRA
preemption of failure to warn claims and concluded such claims were
still preempted. "
First, the plurality opinion in Medtronic placed a great deal of
emphasis on the particular ease with which a medical device manufacturer can get approval for his product under the MDA. Consequently,
the plurality refused to "infer that Congress intended to have whatever
consumer protection might be afforded by common law tort actions
preempted in favor of a regulatory scheme that was largely toothless

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
"o'Id. (Breyer, J.,
Medtronic, 116 S.Ct. at 2262-63 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
' Id. at 2263 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'
Id. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"0 682 A.2d 724 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
"I Id. at732.
'
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because of the MDA's 'grandfathering' Lad 'substantially equivalent'
provisions."" 2 Unlike the MDA, however, under FIFRA, pesticides and
pesticide labels are subject to a thorough review by the EPA, and
specific labeling content is mandated under regulations. 11' 3 Furthermore,
almost all pesticides and pesticide labels are subject to the EPA's
rigorous review; there are no provisions for abbreviated review as there
are in the MDA." 4 In addition, plaintiffs are not denied relief entirely
by the preemption provisions of FIFRA; products liability claims such
as a claim of defective design escape FIFRA's preemption as long as
they are not grounded in a claim of inadequate labeling. 1 5 Therefore,
FIFRA is fundamentally different from the MDA, and courts should
recognize this.
Second, the language of FIFRA's preemption statute is different
in significant ways. Both Cippolone and Medtronic state that the
ultimate question is whether Congress intended preemption." 6 Whereas
the MDA's language is somewhat vague in that it never refers with any
specificity to the state requirements it seeks to preempt,' FIFRA is
clear in its aim: it seeks to preempt "any requirements for labeling or
packaging"'" l that interfere with federal law. Congress has thus spoken
clearly in FIFRA with regard to its intent to preempt failure to warn
claims." 9 It also bears mentioning again that the preemption provisions
under FIFRA bear the heading "Uniformity," which further indicates
Congress' preemptive intent. In this regard, the FIFRA preemption
statute bears more resemblance to the statute at issue in Cippolone than
the MDA provision at issue in Medtronic.
Third, the argument that the word "requirements" does not include
state common law tort actions is an argument applicable to the FIFRA
statute. This argument, however, was supported by only a plurality of
the Medtronic Court. In fact, a majority of the Justices concluded that
the term "requirements" did indeed encompass state common law tort
actions. 2' Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the intent of Congress
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in this instance dictates that the term must be construed to include state
common law tort actions, or the true intent of Congress would not be
reflected in the statute. The better result would be reached if the Court
returned to Cippolone and held that the term "requirements" can (and
as used in FIFRA does) encompass state common law tort actions.
CONCLUSION

Although doubt may have existed at one time about the preemptive
effect of section 136v, and although the Supreme Court has given
unclear signals from its decisions in Medtronic and Cippolone as to
whether it would decide FIFRA preempts state common law failure to
warn claims, the lower courts are in general agreement that Congress
intended under FIFRA to preempt such claims. Perhaps the most
significant reason that courts have concluded FIFRA does not preempt
state common law failure to warn claims is that plaintiffs may not have
a theory of recovery if preemption is found. The sympathy of a court
should not blind it to the clear intent of Congress in the statutory
language itself. It is by necessity, for the sake of uniformity, that such
actions are preempted. Disapproval of the decision of Congress to make
uniformity important to the Act should be directed to Congress, and
should not be grounds for judicial activism and creative problemsolving by the courts. Perhaps, in the end, the only way to resolve the
inconsistencies among the courts is for Congress or the Supreme Court
to speak with unmistakable clarity on the issue, so that those dissonant
courts will no longer have an avenue to grasp for what appears to be an
equitable result.

